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Workers' Compensation Exclusivity and Wrongful
Termination Tort Damages: An Injurious
Tug of War?
by
LAURA QUACKENBUSH*
The California Labor Code provides that workers' compensation is
"the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee . . .against the em-
ployer."' The Code also provides, however, that an employee can pursue
tort damages in an action at law against the employer if (1) conditions of
compensability do not exist, 2 or (2) there is an applicable statutory excep-
tion to the exclusivity bar.3
In 1987 two California Courts of Appeal for the first time faced the
issue whether it is appropriate to apply this exclusivity provision to bar
claims for wrongful termination injuries.4 In Shoemaker v. Myers, 5 the
Third District Court of Appeal held that workers' compensation was the
exclusive remedy for wrongful termination damages, both pre- and post-
termination. 6 In seeming contrast, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in Green v. City of Oceanside upheld a jury award for a discharged em-
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West Supp. 1987). See infra note 40 and accompanying
text.
2. Id § 3600(a)(1)-(9). "Conditions of compensability" is a term of art. Of those condi-
tions enumerated in the Code, this Note focuses on only two conditions: 1) services performed
must arise out of employment and be in the course of employment, and 2) injuries must be
proximately caused by the employment. Id § 3600(a)(2)-(3); see infra notes 31-34 and accom-
panying text.
3. Id. § 3602. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
4. In this Note "wrongful termination cause of action" means termination of employ-
ment either in violation of public policy or by breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. See, eg., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. App. 3d 167, 172, 610 P.2d
1330, 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1980)(employee brought action alleging employer had
wrongfully discharged him for refusing to participate in illegal price fixing scheme); Khanna v.
Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 254, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985)(action against employer for
fraud, and breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing). "Wrongful discharge" does not refer to any other cause of action that may be
related to termination of employment, such as negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
5. 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686 (3d Dist. 1987), rev. granted, 43 Cal. 3d
833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (August 26, 1987).
6. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
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ployee's post-termination emotional distress damages.7
Superficially, Shoemaker and Green suggest that the Third and
Fourth Districts of the California Courts of Appeal are in conflict over
the applicability of the exclusivity doctrine to wrongful termination
causes of action. This Note explains, however, why these decisions are
not in conflict. The illusion of a conflict results from the courts' confu-
sion over whether the exclusivity doctrine applies to wrongful termina-
tion claims. This confusion, in turn, stems from the lack of any accepted,
coherent analysis to ascertain whether workers' compensation is the ex-
clusive remedy for all of a particular plaintiff's work-related harms, par-
ticularly when that injury has been caused by a wrongful termination.
Moreover, Shoemaker and Green are not in conflict because they are pro-
cedurally and factually distinguishable.
The need for a comprehensive analysis of wrongful discharge dam-
age claims extends beyond the facts of either Shoemaker or Green. For
example, disputes are appearing in California appellate courts over
whether the exclusivity doctrine provides an affirmative defense to
wrongful discharge. 8 A step-by-step analytical framework is needed
now.
This Note examines the tug of war between workers' compensation
exclusivity and wrongful termination tort damages, and proposes an ana-
lytical approach that will avoid confusion. Section I examines the scope
of the Workers' Compensation Act and the relevant modern sections of
the act.9 Section II discusses the judicial creation and development of
three wrongful termination causes of action: breach of contract; viola-
tion of public policy; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.10 Section III reviews the cases that paved the way for
the conflict between wrongful termination tort damages and workers'
compensation exclusivity.1 Section IV recounts the facts and holdings
of the recent wrongful discharge cases that address whether workers'
compensation exclusivity bars wrongful termination damages.' 2 Section
V critically analyzes each of these cases.13 Section VI suggests a step-by-
step, analytical approach to determine whether workers' compensation
should be the exclusive remedy for any given wrongful termination "in-
7. 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 223 n.2, 230, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475 n.2, 480 (4th Dist. 1987),
rev. denied (Oct. 29, 1987).
8. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. State of Cal., 194 Cal. App. 3d 916, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1987)
(highway patrolman alleged superiors harassed him, forcing him to take disability retirement);
see also, Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 824 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1987)(employee's workers' compensa-
tion settlement did not bar relief for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
9. See infra notes 15-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-149 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 150-83 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 184-227 and accompanying text.
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jury."14 This four-step analysis considers the following issues: (1)
Whether the damages of a wrongful termination cause of action are an
"injury" under workers' compensation; (2) whether a wrongful termina-
tion injury satisfies all of the requisite conditions of compensability; (3)
whether the wrongful termination cause of action comes within the scope
of the exclusivity doctrine; and (4) whether any statutory or implied ex-
ceptions to exclusivity apply to a wrongful termination injury.
I. Workers' Compensation Overview
The workers' compensation system was imported into the United
States from England in the early 1900s. 15 Its adoption was a reasonable
response to the needs of employees injured on the job, especially in the
wake of the Industrial Revolution.16 California's early enactments of a
workers' compensation plan developed into the Workmen's Compensa-
tion, Insurance and Safety Act of 1917.17 In 1937 the Act was restated
and codified in the California Labor Code.'8
A. Underlying Purpose
Workers' compensation is premised on a trade-off: the employer as-
sumes no-fault liability for injuries caused by the employee's work and, in
exchange, is relieved of the potential burden of large civil action damage
awards.' 9 The employer's liability is essentially limited to the employee's
reasonable medical and legal expenses, plus compensation for a percent-
age of the employee's lost wages.20 The percentage is based on the extent
and duration of the employee's disability.2 '
The California Constitution states that the purpose of workers' com-
pensation is to provide substantial justice expeditiously, inexpensively,
and without encumbrance.22 One commentator has said that "the essen-
tial intent of such a system is limited to assuring the injured workman
14. See infra notes 228-43 and accompanying text.
15. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (MB) § 5.20, at 37 (1964).
In 1911, California passed the Roseberry Act, ch. 399, 1911 Cal. Stat. 796, to enable employers
to elect workers' compensation coverage. Two years later, the Boynton Act, cl. 176, 1913 Cal.
Stat. 279, made such coverage compulsory for employers.
16. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 15, § 5.20, at 37.
17. Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act, ch. 586, 1917 Cal. Stat. 831.
18. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1971 & West Supp. 1987).
19. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 15, § 65.11, at 12-1, -9 (May 7, 1987). See CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1988)(employer liable without regard to negligence); id. § 3602
(workers' compensation is essentially the employee's exclusive remedy against the insured
employer).
20. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4600, 4621, 4650-4663 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988).
21. Id. §§ 4451-5106 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988).
22. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21. Nonetheless, the employee must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that his work caused his injury. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3202.5, 3600 (West
Supp. 1988).
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and his dependents a reasonable subsistence while he is unable to work,
and to effectuating his speedy rehabilitation and reentry into the labor
market. '2 3 Thus, the compensation payment is intended not to make the
injured employee whole, but to prevent the employee from going on wel-
fare while disabled.24
B. Injury
The starting point and focus of any workers' compensation claim by
an employee is an injury.25 As early as 1915, the compensation law was
amended to include injuries other than those caused by a work acci-
dent.26 The California Labor Code provides a somewhat circular defini-
tion of an injury: " 'Injury' includes any injury or disease arising out of
the employment. '2 7
As currently defined, "injury" has been construed to mean bodily
injury. 28 However, "bodily injury" has been interpreted to include an
injury to the nervous system which manifests itself as a mental disorder.
To the extent that such a mental impairment is disabling and caused by
the work environment, it is treated as an injury under the workers' com-
pensation system.2 9
In 1968, the Labor Code was amended, adding the following provi-
sions to the definition of "injury":
§ 3208.1. An injury may be either: (a) "specific," occurring as
the result of one incident or exposure which causes disability or need
for medical treatment; or (b) "cumulative," occurring as repetitive
mentally or physically traumatic activities extending over a period of
time, the combined effect of which causes any disability or need for
medical treatment....
§ 3208.2. When disability, need for medical treatment, or death
results from the combined effects of two or more injuries, either spe-
cific, cumulative, or both, all questions of fact and law shall be sepa-
rately determined with respect to each such injury, including, but not
23. 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 1.05(5)(a) at 1-29 (2d ed. 1987).
24. Id. § 12.01(1) at 12-2 to -3 (citing West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 79 Cal. App.
711, 180 P.2d 972 (1947)).
25. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23, § 11.01(1), at 11-3.
26. See J. MASTORIS, CIVIL LITIGATION AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A CONTINU-
ING CONFLICT 50.
27. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208 (West Supp. 1988). This includes "injuries to artificial
members, dentures, hearing aids, eyeglasses and medical braces of all types; provided, how-
ever, that eyeglasses and hearing aids will not be replaced, repaired, or otherwise compensated
for, unless injury to them is incident to an injury causing disability." Id. Note that work-
related damage to personal property is not an "injury" except as specified in § 3208. Id.
§ 2802.
28. San Francisco v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 183 Cal. 273, 275, 191 P. 26, 26
(1920).
29. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23, § 11.01(2)(e), at 11-9.
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limited to, the apportionment between such injuries of liability for dis-
ability benefits, the cost of medical treatment, and any death benefit.
§ 5303. [N]o injury, whether specific or cumulative, shall, for any
purpose whatsoever, merge into or form a part of another injury; nor
shall any award based on a cumulative injury include disability caused
by any specific injury or by any other cumulative injury causing or
contributing to the existing disability, need for medical treatments or
death.30
C. Conditions of Compensability
In order for a work-related injury to be covered by workers' com-
pensation, the following conditions must all concur when the injury is
sustained:31 (1) there must be an "employer" and an "employee," as de-
fined in the statute;32 (2) the employee must be performing a service aris-
ing out of or incident to his employment, and he must be acting within
the course of his employment;33 and (3) the injury must be proximately
caused by the employment.34
The following conditions, however, preclude employee compensa-
tion: When the injury is caused by the employee's own intoxication;35
30. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3208.1-.2, 5303 (West Supp. 1988); see also Kyles v. Workers'
Comp. Appeals Bd., 195 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620, 240 Cal. Rptr. 886, 889-90 (1987) (disability
finding is not required as a condition to recovery for needed medical treatment under workers'
compensation statutes).
31. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(West Supp. 1988); see also, 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23,
§ 8.03(2), at 8-12 to -16 (discussing California's uniquely restrictive compensation statute and
the judiciary's disregard of these statutory restrictions).
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
33. Id § 3600(a)(2). The "course of employment" requirement tends to be liberally in-
terpreted to include many off-premises and even rule-violating activities, as long as they are
reasonably related to what the employment contract expressly or impliedly authorizes. See,
e.g., State Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 380,
383-84, 217 P.2d 992, 994-95 (1950); 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23, § 8.04, at 8-32 to -39.
Indeed, all of the workers' compensation statutes are to "be liberally construed by the courts
with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course
of their employment." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West Supp. 1988).
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988). This "proximate cause" require-
ment is unique to the California compensation statute. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23, § 8.03(4),
at 8-16. The courts have tended to construe "proximate cause" so broadly that even a merely
coincidental connection can satisfy the statutory requirement of a causal connection. Albert-
son's, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Ed., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 315-16, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304,
308-09 (1982); 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23, § 8.03(5)(c), at 8-21 to -24. Moreover, the causal
connection between the employment and the injury need not be the sole cause of the injury but
may be merely a contributing cause. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
176 Cal. App. 2d 10, 17-21, 1 Cal. Rptr. 73, 78-80 (1959). Yet, "compensation will not be
awarded where the nature of the employee's duties provides merely a stage for the event or the
employment itself was not a positive factor influencing the course of the disease process." 2W.
HANNA, supra note 23, § 8.03(6)(h), at 8-31 (citing Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Ap-
peals Ed., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982)).
35. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(4) (West Supp. 1988).
when injury or death is intentional or self-caused; 36 when the employee is
injured as a result of his own physical aggression 37 or felonious act for
which he is convicted; 38 or when the injury arises out of voluntary, off-
duty nonwork-related activities by the employee that are not required by
the employment. 39
D. Exclusivity and Exceptions
Generally, workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive rem-
edy against his employer for any injury sustained by the employee. 40
There are, however, several exceptions to this rule. First, an employee
may file a claim for benefits under workers' compensation, for damages
in the civil court, or for both. If an employee brings a tort action against
an employer in an attempt to recover damages for a work injury, the
employer has the burden of proving the affirmative defense that workers'
compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy, unless an employee-
employer relationship is clearly shown in the complaint.41 Thus, an em-
ployer who fails to raise or to prove the issue of employment will be
subject to the court's jurisdiction. If claims are filed for both benefits and
damages, the first final determination of jurisdiction by either the civil
court or the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is binding on the
other tribunal.42 Moreover, when an employer does not object to a tort
action brought by the employee, in addition to a workers' compensation
claim, the actions will proceed in both forums; nevertheless, the em-
ployer "may always have an offset for payments made in one jurisdiction
against the judgment or award in the other tribunal. ' 43 Finally, if any of
36. Id. § 3600(a)(5)-(6).
37. Id. § 3600(a)(7).
38. Id. § 3600(a)(8).
39. Id. § 3600(a)(9).
40. Id. § 3602(a) ("Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 con-
cur, the right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section
and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her
dependents against the employer ....")
Section 3601(a) provides parallel language that compensation is the employee's exclusive
remedy, with several exceptions, against a co-employee acting within the scope of his
employment.
41. Doney v. Tambouratgis, 23 Cal. 3d 91, 96-99, 587 P.2d 1160, 1163-65, 151 Cal. Rptr.
347, 349-51 (1979) (affirmed damages award to employee alleging assault and battery where
employment relationship did not appear on face of complaint and employer did not raise it as
an affirmative defense). An "employee" is "every person in the service of an employer under
any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written,
whether lawfully or unlawfully employed .... CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West Supp. 1988).
The Code also sets forth various exclusions from employee status (for example, most volun-
teers, watchmen for nonindustrial establishments, and independent contractors). Id. §§ 3352-
3353, 3358.
42. J. MASTORIS, supra note 26, at 41.
43. Id. at 42.
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the conditions of compensability do not concur, or if the circumstances
fall within one of several codified exceptions the exclusivity rule will not
bar a civil action.44
The Labor Code expressly permits an injured employee to seek dam-
ages in an action at law when the employee's injury or death is the result
of or is aggravated by the employer's wrongdoing.45 In addition, the
1982 amendment to the workers' compensation law46 codified three "im-
plied exceptions" to the exclusive remedy provision that had been recog-
nized at common law:47 (1) the dual capacity doctrine;48 (2) intentional
physical assaults by the employer;49 and (3) fraudulent concealment of an
44. "[W]here the conditions of compensation set forth in section 3600 do not concur, the
liability of the employer shall be the same as if this division had not been enacted." CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3602(c) (West Supp. 1988).
45. Section 3602(b) permits an action for damages:
(1) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a willful physical
assault by the employer.
(2) Where the employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent conceal-
ment of the existence of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which
case the employer's liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by
the aggravation ....
(3) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a defective prod-
uct manufactured by the employer and sold, leased, or otherwise transferred for valu-
able consideration to an independent third person, and that product is thereafter
provided for the employee's use by a third person.
Id. § 3602(b)(l)-(3).
Labor Code section 3706 provides another exception where the employer has failed to
obtain workers' compensation insurance for his employees. Section 4558 provides a "power
press guard" exception.
46. Assembly Bill 684 was enacted in 1982 by the California legislature and became effec-
tive January 1, 1983. Prior to its enactment, the bill was described as being a "benefit/reform
package" that provided a trade-off of substantial increases in indemnity and benefits in ex-
change for extensive reforms. See Benefit/Reform Package Emerges for Legislative Action, 10
CALIF. WORKERS' COMp. R.PTR. 145, 145 (1982). The reforms included a preponderance-of-
the evidence test for questions of fact, a one-year time limit to request vocational rehabilitation
benefits, and "tightening" of the exclusive remedy law to preclude actions at law for damages
against the employer based on the fact of the employer's dual capacity relationship to the
employee prior to or at the time of the injury. On the other hand, the bill permitted actions for
damages for those exceptions set forth in Labor Code section 3602(b)(l)-(3). See supra note
45.
The bill also provided for changes in the remedy for serious and willful misconduct by the
employee (for example, elimination of the former $10,000 ceiling on the 50% surcharge on the
amount of compensation otherwise recoverable).
47. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a), (b)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1988).
48. See, e.g., Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr.
30 (1981) (employer-manufacturer could be held strictly liable, in employer's capacity as man-
ufacturer, for injury to employee using employer's product); Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781,
249 P.2d 8 (1952) (employer-physician, who negligently treated employee, could be liable in a
common-law malpractice action in his capacity as physician). The current status of the dual
capacity doctrine is reflected in California Labor Code § 3602(b)(3). See supra note 45.
49. See Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 635
(1975) (exclusivity provisions do not apply to an intentional physical assault by employer); see
August 1988]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
employee's injury. 50 Two other common-law exceptions, however, were
not included in the amendment: (1) defamation; 51 and (2) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, when the primary claim is for a non-disa-
bling emotional injury and, at most, any physical injury is mere
"makeweight." 52
This codification of select exceptions has led some litigants to assert
that the legislature intended thereby to bar any future judicially-implied
exceptions to exclusivity. 53 The status of the defamation and emotional
distress "exceptions"-and whether, in fact, they should be viewed as
exceptions at all-is discussed in sections III through V. First, however,
it is important to review the creation and development of three wrongful
termination causes of action. These causes of action call upon theories of
breach of contract, public policy, and the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
II. Development of Wrongful Termination Causes of Action
A. Wrongful Termination Breach of Contract
An employee may base a wrongful termination claim on a breach of
contract theory. In such actions, the employee is limited to the tradi-
also Young v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1042, 214 Cal. Rptr. 400, 403
(1985) (employer ratification of co-employee's assault on another employee excepted from ex-
clusivity provision); Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 226-29, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 696, 700-02 (1983) (exclusivity does not preclude damage claims when intentional physi-
cal acts ratified by the employer caused the harm). Although the latter two cases were decided
after the 1982 amendments to the Labor Code, both cases involved events that preceded the
amendments' effective date. Therefore, these cases applied pre-amendment law.
50. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 477-79, 165
Cal. Rptr. 858, 865-66 (1980) (implied exception to exclusivity provision for aggravation of a
work-related injury where employer intentionally concealed existence of injury and its rela-
tionship to workplace).
51. See, e.g., Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 902-05, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287-
89 (1983) (exclusivity provision not applicable to slander action because reputation injury is a
proprietary interest and, therefore, not within the scope of workers' compensation); see infra
notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
52. Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452
(1978) (quoting 2 A. LARSON, supra note 15, § 68.34, at 13-31 to -32 (1978)). The Renteria
court held that when an employee suffers non-compensable emotional distress and physical
injury that is, at most, mere makeweight, there is an implied exception to exclusivity for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
53. "[A] call for the courts to fill a gap in the law which the Legislature failed to antici-
pate . . . is a direct, frontal assault on the policy choice made by the Legislature when the
statute was enacted, and reaffirmed as recently as 1982." Brief of Amicus Curiae Merchants
and Manufacturers Association in Support of Position of Respondents at 25, Shoemaker v.
Myers, 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1987), rev. granted, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 740 P.2d
404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Aug. 26, 1987). But see Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189
Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1431, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 75 (1987) (1982 amendment did not preclude the
existence of implied exceptions), rev. denied (June 17, 1987).
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tional, foreseeable contract damages, which invariably exclude emotional
distress and punitive damages.5 4 Labor Code section 2922 provides that
"[a]n employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the
will of either party on notice to the other."' 55 In contrast, where the em-
ployment is for a specified term of more than one month, section 2924
states that the employer may terminate the employment at any time if
the employee has willfully breached, has habitually neglected, or has
been continually incapable of performing his duty.5 6
When the employment is not for a specified term, courts have quali-
fied the harshness of the at-will doctrine by recognizing an exception if
the employer and employee agreed, either expressly 57 or impliedly,58 that
the employee would not be discharged except for good cause. When such
a promise exists, the employee who is discharged without good cause
may recover damages for breach of the employment contract.5 9 Dam-
ages for the breach are the amount of compensation-including, for ex-
ample, salary, bonus, and pension rights-that the employee would have
earned over a reasonable period of employment, had he not been termi-
nated, less any compensation actually earned by the employee during
that timeA"
Similarly, courts have construed Labor Code section 2924 as mean-
ing that employment for a specified term of greater than one month (and
thus not part of the at-will doctrine) is terminable by the employer dur-
54. Unless the employee can prove that his unusual damages were due to special circum-
stances that were known or should have been known by the employer at the time of entering
the contract, the employee is precluded from an award of unusual damages. See generally 1 B.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CoNTRACTS § 815, at 733-34 (9th ed. 1987) (dis-
cussing California's application of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854) ("[I]f special circumstances cause some unusual injury, special damages are not
recoverable... unless the circumstances were known or should have been known to the guilty
party at the time he entered into the contract.").
55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971).
56. Id. § 2924.
57. See, eg., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 96, 127 Cal. Rptr.
222, 225 (1976) (discharge contrary to contractual promise of permanent employment so long
as work was satisfactory).
58. See, eg., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322, 324-26, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 922, 924-25 (1981). An employer's right to discharge an at-will employee is limited
"when the discharge is contrary to the terms of the agreement, express or implied." Id. at 322,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 922. The express or implied promise may be based on the employer's words,
conduct, custom, or some combination thereof. Id at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
59. Id at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927; see alsoKhanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App.
3d 250, 259-60, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 865 (1985).' - '
A "contract of employment" is "a contract by which one, who is called the employer,
engages another, who is called the employee, to do something for the benefit of the employer or
a third person." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750 (West 1971).
60. See, eg., Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 701, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169,
172 (1972) (sustaining award of damages based on evidence of future lost wages over a reason-
able period of ten years, reduced by current expected earnings).
1237
ing the term only for good cause. 61 Damages for a breach of the employ-
ment contract in this context are the amount of compensation agreed
upon from the date of the breach to the date on which the contract was
to have terminated. 62
B. Tort
(1) Public Policy Wrongful Termination
For many years, the courts have recognized that a cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy exists in addition to
a cause of action for breach of an employment contract. 63 Such a "viola-
tion" may be based on either statutory64 or decisional law. 65 The em-
ployee must prove, inter alia, that his employment was terminated
because he refused to participate in the employer's violation of a public
policy,6 6 or that the termination itself violated public policy. 67
Initially, damages for a wrongful termination in violation of public
policy were limited to traditional contract damages. 68 In Tameny v. At-
lantic Richfield Co.,69 however, the California Supreme Court recognized
that this cause of action also warranted tort damages. The court as-
serted that termination of employment in violation of public policy is a
tortious act, not merely a breach of a contractual promise. 70 The court
61. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1988); see, e.g., Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181
Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1166, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (1986) (section 2924 permits termination of
an employment contract for cause even when the contract is for a specified term, and the term
has not expired).
62. See, e.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 181-82, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 737, 740, 474 P.2d 689, 692 (1970) (measure of recovery is amount of salary agreed upon
for period of service less amount employer proves employee earned or might have earned from
other employment); Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 97-98, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 222, 225-26 (1976) (court deducted employee's earnings in subsequent employment from
earnings he would have had under employment contract).
63. See, e.g., Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 324-25, 202
P.2d 1059, 1060-61 (1949) (discharge for serving as an official in a general election).
64. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-
90, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959) (discharge for refusal to commit perjury on behalf of employer
wrongful).
65. See, e.g., Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Serv., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437,
1443, 234 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1987) (public health concern for patients tended by overworked
staff), rev. denied (April 24, 1987); see also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 171,
172, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-33, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (1980) (recognizing limitation of at-
will doctrine where discharge clearly violated express statutory objectives or undermined es-
tablished public policy principles).
66. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 177, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
67. See, e.g., Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1165-66, 226 Cal. Rptr.
820, 825-26 (1986) (dictum) (discharge for taking time off to serve on a jury, or for refusing to
adopt employer's political line violation of public policy).
68. See, e.g., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
69. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
70. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
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explained that the labeling of the discharge as "wrongful" is not based on
the contract terms, but rather arises out of a duty implied in law on the
part of the employer to conduct its affairs in compliance with public pol-
icy.71 Thus, damages may be awarded not only for the value of lost com-
pensation and benefits under the employment contract, but also for
consequential economic damages, emotional distress, punitive damages,
and other items deemed appropriate by the trier of fact.72
(2) Wrongful Termination Based Upon the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
The third theory on which a wrongful termination claim may be
based is breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The plaintiff-employee in Tameny tried to state such a cause of action in
addition to his violation of public policy claim.73 In its now-famous foot-
note twelve, however, the court side-stepped whether Tameny could state
a cause of action on that theory, because "neither plaintiffs nor defend-
ants suggest[ed] that the elements of a cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant in this context would differ from the elements of an
ordinary wrongful discharge action .... ,,74
The Second District Court of Appeals soon followed through on the
implications of footnote twelve. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 75
the court found "elements" which differed from the public policy wrong-
ful discharge action. The Cleary court stated that "the longevity of the
employee's service, together with the expressed policy of the employer,
operate[d] as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such an
employee by the employer without good cause."' 76 The court thus recog-
nized a new cause of action despite the fact that the employee had also
alleged that he was discharged for engaging in union organizing activ-
71. Id In dictum in Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1163-71, 226
Cal. Rptr. 820, 823-29 (1986), the court labeled this cause of action a "tortious discharge" and
distinguished it from both the breach of employment contract cause of action and the "bad
faith discharge" cause of action (also known as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing).
Recently, this "tortious discharge" cause of action was extended to allow a demoted and
only temporarily suspended employee to maintain an action for wrongful termination where
the employer was allegedly retaliating against the employee for "whistle-blowing"; such retali-
ation is a violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 187 Cal.
App. 3d 1556, 1562, 232 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1986), rev. denied (April 16, 1987).
72. 2 CALIFORNIA JURY INsTRucTIONS, CIVIL No. 10.43, at 49-50 (7th ed. Supp. 1987)
[hereinafter BAJI].
73. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 171, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 841 0980).
74. Id at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
75. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
76. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. Cleary was an 18-year employee.
ity-a classic, statutory violation of public policy. 77
Unlike the breach of employment contract cause of action discussed
above, the court held that this "wrongful discharge" cause of action
sounded in both contract and tort. The employee was thus potentially
"entitled to an award of compensatory damages, and, in addition, puni-
tive damages .... -78 The two types of wrongful termination action differ
conceptually as well. Whereas the contract action arises from a breach
of a promise implied in fact in the employment agreement, the tort action
arises from a violation of a duty implied in law.
Prior to Cleary, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was rec-
ognized as an obligation that the law implies into every contract.79 Ac-
cording to some courts, this covenant obligates each party to refrain from
taking any action that injures the right of the other to receive the benefits
of the agreement.80 Until Cleary, however, tort damages for breach of
this covenant had been awarded only in suits brought by insureds against
insurers. 81 The Cleary extension of tort damages to a breach of the cove-
nant in the employment context appears to have been premised, at least
in part, on the similarity between the employer-employee relationship
and the insurer-insured relationship. These similarities include the une-
qual bargaining positions of the parties and the reliance by the insured
and the employee on the party in the superior position to provide
security.82
Since Cleary, California appellate courts have both expanded and
contracted the parameters of the cause of action for breach of the cove-
nant.83 In Khanna v. Microdata Corp.,84 the employee was terminated
solely because he had sued his employer for commissions that the em-
ployer owed him. Despite the fact that Khanna had only worked for the
employer for two years, the court said that he would be able to maintain
his cause of action sounding in tort because of the employer's bad faith.8 5
The court stated that the factors relied on in Cleary-longevity of em-
77. Id. at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
78. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
79. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958) (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457,
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979) (special relationship between insured and insurer illustrates
public policy considerations to support exemplary damages).
82. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 448-49, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725, 729.
83. The California Supreme Court has not yet recognized this cause of action in the em-
ployment context. But see supra note 74 and accompanying text. At this writing, however, the
Court is about to issue its first opinion regarding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment context. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1985), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Jan. 30, 1986).
84. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 256-57, 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 863, 868 (1985).
85. Id. at 253-57, 264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 861-63, 869.
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ployment and the employer's policy86-are not
the sine qua non to establishing a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied in every employment contract .... To the
contrary, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in employment contracts is established whenever the employer en-
gages in "bad faith action extraneous to the contract, combined with
the obligor's intent to frustrate the [employee's] enjoyment of contract
rights."
87
As with public policy wrongful termination, damages for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may include not only the
value of the lost compensation and benefits under the employment con-
tract, but also consequential economic damages, emotional distress, puni-
tive, and other items of damage deemed appropriate by the trier of fact.88
C. Constructive Wrongful Termination
An employment termination may be either "actual" or "construc-
tive." A termination is actual when the employer notifies the employee,
either orally or in writing, that his employment is terminated. It is con-
structive when the employee resigns because of the employer's conduct, if
a reasonable person in the employee's position would have acted
similarly.89
Generally, courts do not require that the employer have intended,
86. Id. at 262-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.
87. Id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (citations omitted); see also Koehrer v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1167-71, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826-29 (1986) (implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing breached if the employer asserts without probable cause and in bad
faith that good cause discharge in fact existed); Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 253, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (1984) (approving instruction mak-
ing good faith in terminating the employment, based on mistaken belief, a defense); Shapiro v.
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984)
(there must be conduct by the defendant that is extraneous to the contract).
88. BARI, supra note 72, No. 10.43, at 49-50.
89. See, eg., Moreno v. Cairns, 20 Cal. 2d 531, 534-35, 127 P.2d 914, 916-17 (1942)
(resignation made under duress from employer is akin to discharge); Keithley v. Civil Service
Bd., 11 Cal. App. 3d 443, 449-52, 89 Cal. Rptr. 809, 812-15 (1970) (coerced resignation is
tantamount to discharge). BAJI lists the following questions as examples of factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether a resignation was a constructive termination:
1) Whether the resignation was obtained through coercion, fraud, threats, or undue in-
fluence.
2) Whether the employee was told to resign or be fired, and the employer had no good
cause for telling him that.
3) Whether the employee was demoted without good cause.
4) Whether the employee was forced to work under such difficult or unpleasant circum-
stances as would cause a reasonable person to resign.
5) Whether the employee's salary or benefits were substantially reduced without good
cause.
6) Whether the employee was discriminated against because of race, religion, sex, na-
tionality, age, or handicap. BAI, supra note 72, No. 10.02, at 34-36.
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by his conduct, to cause the employee to resign.90 To establish public
policy wrongful termination, however, the employee must demonstrate
"facts and circumstances showing that the employer had actual or con-
structive knowledge of the intolerable actions and conditions and of their
impact on the employee, and could have remedied the situation." 91
Any of the wrongful termination causes of action discussed above
may be based on an actual or constructive termination. For example, if
an employee resigns because of conduct in violation of public policy-
such as discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by the employer--or be-
cause of conduct by the employer that would constitute a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or of an employment
contract there may be constructive termination. 92
III. Antecedent Cases to the Conflict Between Workers'
Compensation Exclusivity and Wrongful Termination
Tort Damages
With the judicial creation of tort remedies for wrongful termination
causes of action in 1980,93 the scene was set for the eventual conflict
between workers' compensation exclusivity for work-related injuries and
wrongful termination tort damages for termination-related injuries. At
least a decade before the creation of tort remedies for wrongful termina-
tion, signs of this ultimate confrontation began to appear in cases alleging
the related tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 94 Subse-
quently, the confrontation was extended to defamation cases.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Termination Cases
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been the
most fertile source of cases prior to the current confrontation, for two
reasons. First, the cause of action requires the plaintiff to allege suffering
severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant's knowing or reck-
90. E.g., Brady v. Elixir Indus., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 1306, 242 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328
(1987) (citing Nolan v. Cleveland, 686 F.2d 806, 814 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982)), rev. denied (Feb.
24, 1988).
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also Moreno, 20 Cal. 2d at 534-35, 127 P.2d at 916-17 (resignations under
duress constitute unlawful discharge); Monge v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 507-08,
222 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65-66 (1986) (sexual discrimination and harassment constitutes a construc-
tive termination of employment); Keithley, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 449-52, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 812-15
(police officer unlawfully discharged because excessive pressure from his superiors forced him
to resign).
93. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980) (violation of public policy); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
94. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
WORKERS' COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY
less and outrageous conduct. 95 Since severe emotional distress is re-
quired, often an injury compensable under workers' compensation will
have been sustained-an injury requiring medical treatment, resulting in
a disabling physical symptom, or resulting in a mental disability.96 Sec-
ond, the fact patterns in cases alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress are often quite similar to those occurring before or during a
wrongful termination. For example, allegations of harassment, discrimi-
natory conduct, or false accusations commonly appear in both types of
action.97
Ten years before the judicial creation of tort remedies for wrongful
termination, the California Supreme Court in Alcorn v. Anbro Engineer-
ing, Inc. 98 held that a wrongfully terminated employee stated a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Alcorn alleged that
his foreman responded to some advice by shouting, "'You goddam nig-
gers are not going to tell me about the rules .... ' "and then firing him.99
Alcorn also alleged facts sufficient to indicate that the foreman mali-
ciously intended to cause Alcorn to suffer physical and mental distress,
and that he did sustain distress in the form of shock, nausea, and insom-
nia.100 Even though Alcorn was reinstated through grievance and arbi-
tration procedures, he was allowed to pursue a tort action to recover
both actual and punitive damages incident to the termination. 101 It
should be noted that the employer never raised workers' compensation
exclusivity as an affirmative defense, even though shock, nausea, and in-
somnia might have been compensable if the other conditions of compen-
sation concurred. 102
Nine years later, exclusivity was raised as a successful affirmative
defense to an employee's termination-related intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. In Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 103 the employee
apparently suffered distress during a dispute over using his accrued over-
time and vacation time to extend his sick leave while he recovered from a
work injury. The dispute culminated in his being fired. He was sub-
jected to further distressing conduct by the employer when he went to
retrieve his personal possessions from his desk, following the termina-
tion.104 After all of these incidents, Gates reportedly suffered from in-
95. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 56-65 (5th ed. 1984); see also
Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (plaintiff
suffered from shock and other disturbances to the nervous system).
96. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3208, 3208.1 (West Supp. 1988).
97. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
98. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 489-99, 468 P.2d 216, 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90-91 (1970).
99. Id at 496-97, 468 P.2d at 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
100. Idr at 497-98, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal.Rptr. at 90.
101. Id at 497, 468 P.2d at 217-18, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
102. See J. MASTORIS, supra note 26, at 52.
103. 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 199, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488 (1979).
104. Id. at 199-200, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89.
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somnia, aggravation of the pain from his work injury, a preoccupation
with what had happened, and a worsening of sexual relations with his
wife. He also sought medical and counseling treatments.' 5
The Second District held that the exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation barred the employee's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.'0 6 The court held that exclusivity applied because (1) the
employee's injuries were sustained while he was still an employee for
workers' compensation purposes, and (2) he alleged that he was physi-
cally injured and disabled as a result of the employer's acts. Thus, under
the facts of this case, distress suffered following the termination was suf-
fered while the plaintiff was still an employee as well.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Nontermination Cases
Until 1987, with the exception of Gates, the issue of exclusivity only
arose in cases in which the employee was not terminated. Beginning in
1978 with Renteria v. County of Orange, 107 courts began to focus on the
nature of the alleged emotional distress to determine whether exclusivity
should bar an action at law in this context. Renteria claimed that his
employer treated him in a degrading manner, placed him under surveil-
lance, interrogated him at length, and discriminated against him because
of his Mexican-American heritage.10 8 Renteria alleged neither that his
resulting mental distress caused any physical or mental illness, nor that it
resulted in an employment disability.' 0 9 The Renteria court held that
workers' compensation exclusivity did not bar the employee's cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because nondis-
abling mental suffering, not accompanied by a physical injury, is not a
compensable injury under workers' compensation. '10 Moreover, the
court recognized that although Labor Code section 4553 provides a fifty
percent surcharge against an employer for injuries caused by the em-
ployer's serious and willful misconduct, "[w]here there is no compensa-
ble injury, fifty percent of nothing is still nothing, and Labor Code
section 4553 cannot function as a deterrent.""'
The Renteria decision is significant because the court declined to
interpret the Workers' Compensation Act as shielding employers from
liability for noncompensable injuries caused by the employer's intention-
ally outrageous conduct, and, further, because the court construed the
employee's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
105. Id. at 201, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
106. A second cause of action, for conversion of personal property, was not barred. Id.
107. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
108. Id. at 835, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
109. Id. at 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
110. Id. at 840, 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
111. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
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to be an implied exception to exclusivity.112 Renteria is also significant
for adopting an essence of the action test advocated by nationally re-
nowned workers' compensation commentator Arthur Larson:
"If the essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries
are of the usual non-physical sort, with physical injuries being at most
added to the list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be
barred. But if the essence of the action is recovery for physical injury
or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the form
of a normally non-physical tort. '1
13
Following Renteria, courts rather arbitrarily and inconsistently de-
termined whether or not to apply the exclusivity bar by evaluating
whether an alleged physical injury was significant or only makeweight.11 4
In January 1987, the California Supreme Court handed down the
important decision of Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District. 1 15 Even
though the court applied pre-1983 law, nothing in the decision suggests
that it would not be equally applicable to the present version of the Labor
Code. The language and facts of Cole have provided ammunition for
both employees and employers in subsequent wrongful termination ac-
tions. It must be emphasized, however, that Cole itself is not a wrongful
termination case, and that Supreme Court review was limited to causes
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of
consortium.116
112. Id. at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452. This Note suggests that, since the emotional harm
in Renteria is not an "injury" for the purposes of workers' compensation, exclusivity is inappli-
cable; the "implied exception" recognized in Renteria is therefore unneccessary. See discus-
sion infra in Section VI.
113. Id. (quoting 2 A. LARSON, supra note 15, § 68.34, at 13-31 to -32 (1978)). A similar
quotation from Larson appears in the recent California Supreme Court decision of Cole v. Fair
Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315
(1987).
114. Compare, eg., Hollywood Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App.
3d 754, 759, 210 Cal. Rptr. 619, 621 (1985) (action barred because already compensated, disa-
bling physical injury alleged); Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531,
533, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828, 829 (1979) (action barred by exclusive remedy provisions because
physical illness and disability accompanied emotional distress) with Iverson v. Atlas Pacific
Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 230, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696, 703 (1983) (action not barred even
though employee alleged hearing loss, since gravamen of complaint was nondisabling, non-
compensable emotional harm); McGee v. McNally, 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894-96, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 253, 255-57 (1981) (action not barred because complaint could be amended to excise
physical injury language, which was only lightly traced in the pleading and was stated without
reference to particulars, and emphasis was on purely emotional trauma); see supra notes 103-
06 and accompanying text. But see Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d
1420, 1429, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73-74 (1987) (physical-emotional dichotomy discarded as irrele-
vant), rev. denied (June 17, 1987); see infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
115. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
116. Id. at 151, 162-63, 729 P.2d at 744, 751-52, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309, 317. It should be
noted that the Court of Appeal affirmed the demurrer as to eight of the ten original causes of
action, "but reversed with directions to permit amendment of the complaint as to causes of
action for defamation and for false light invasion of privacy." Id. at 151, 729 P.2d at 744, 233
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The facts in Cole were particularly egregious. Allegedly in retalia-
tion for Cole's union activities, management engaged in a campaign of
harassment, during which management made false accusations of dishon-
esty regarding Cole's workers' compensation claim for hypertension,
conducted a "kangaroo" hearing, demoted him from fire captain to an
entry level position, and attempted to force his retirement.1 17 Reportedly
as a consequence of the harassment, Cole suffered a totally disabling cer-
ebral vascular accident. 118 The stroke left him unable to move, except to
communicate by blinking his eyes. 119
The court held that Cole's claims were barred by the exclusive rem-
edy provision. 120 First, it held that Renteria did not apply because Cole
did suffer a compensable physical injury or disability; thus, the deterrents
of compensation and additional recovery under Labor Code section 4553
were available to him.121
Next, the court addressed the significance of an employer's pur-
posely causing an employee to suffer emotional distress that results in
disability. 122 While noting that an employer's mere reckless disregard
would not warrant an exclusivity exemption, the court found that an em-
ployer's supervisory conduct is inherently "intentional."1 23 Nonetheless,
to avoid "throw[ing] open the doors to numerous claims already com-
pensable under the compensation law,"' 124 the court extended the exclu-
sivity bar to Cole's action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 125 Thus, an employee cannot avoid exclusivity by merely "char-
acterizing the employer's decisions as manifestly unfair, outrageous, har-
assment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance resulting in
disability."1 26
In dictum, however, the court also stated that exclusivity will shield
an employer's intentional misconduct only with regard to "actions which
are a normal part of the employment relationship, such as demotions,
promotions, criticism of work practices, and frictions in negotiations as
to grievances .... "127 The court recognized that employees may recover
for intentional misconduct that has caused some disability in cases
involv[ing] conduct of an employer having a "questionable" relation-
Cal. Rptr. at 309. The employer did not challenge the Court of Appeal's holding that neither
of these two causes of action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions.
117. Id. at 152-53, 729 P.2d at 744-45, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
118. Id. at 153, 729 P.2d at 745, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
119. Id. at 152-53, 729 P.2d at 744-45, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
120. Id. at 151, 729 P.2d at 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
121. Id. at 156-57, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
122. Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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ship to the employment, an injury which did not occur while the em-
ployee was performing service incidental to the employment and which
would not be viewed as a risk of the employment, or conduct where the
employer or insurer stepped out of their proper roles.128
Two months after Cole, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
adopted this language in Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co. 129 In
Hart, the employer's ratification of a supervisor's sexually offensive re-
marks and suggestive physical gestures was deemed to be conduct having
a "questionable relationship to employment, and ... neither a risk, an
incident, nor a normal part of Hart's employment .... -130
Hart alleged both tort damages (physical and emotional distress)
and work disability.131 Nonetheless, the court stated:
We believe the time should and has come to cast aside the arbitrary
and sometimes irrationally applied "physical versus emotional harm"
approach in favor of another factor more logically connected to the
workers' compensation suit-at-law choice. That factor is whether the
acts complained of were a "normal part of the employment relation-
ship", or, whether the acts were incidents of the employment
relationship. 132
Because the intentional misconduct had a questionable relationship to
the employment, workers' compensation exclusivity was not a bar to
Hart's suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress, despite the al-
leged physical injury and work disability. 133
C. Defamation
Another tort frequently asserted by wrongfully terminated employ-
ees is defamation. This tort has been construed as an "implied excep-
tion" to exclusivity. The Third District, in the recent case of Howland v.
Balma, 1 34 quoted approvingly a Massachusetts court:
The [Workers' Compensation] act has been interpreted to encompass
physical and mental injuries arising out of employment, whereas the
gist of an action for defamation is injury to reputation, irrespective of
any physical harm or mental harm. We recognize the conceptual
problem inherent in the employee's [complaint] including physical and
mental injury as elements of damage in the defamation claim. How-
ever, we feel that to block the main thrust of this action because of
peripheral items of damages, when a compensation claim could not
purport to give relief for the main wrong of injury to reputation, would
128. Id. at 161, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
129. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1429-31, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74-75 (1987), rev. denied (June 17,
1987).
130. Id. at 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
131. Id. at 1425-26, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
132. Id. at 1429, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74 (citation omitted) (quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire
Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987)).
133. Id. at 1427-32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 72-76 (citation omitted in opinion).
134. 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (3d Dist. 1983).
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be incongruous, and outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness
clause. 135
Thus, Howland indicates that the workers' compensation system was not
intended to cover claims for injury to reputation, even when physical
injury has resulted.
The Howland court also invoked Professor Larson's "essence of the
action" rationale, 136 previously relied upon in intentional infliction of
emotional distress cases. 137 Howland's action for damages to reputation
was allowed to proceed even though he had previously executed a work-
ers' compensation compromise and release for his slander-related physi-
cal and mental injuries. 138
D. Cases Involving Pretermination Injuries
Most civil actions brought by employees have alleged injuries suf-
fered following their termination. Some cases, however, have involved
pretermination injuries. Georgia-Pacific Corporation v. Workers' Com-
pensation Appeals Board139 addressed the issue whether an employee's
claim was compensable under workers' compensation, not whether it was
excluded. The employee had sought only workers' compensation cover-
age-not a tort remedy-for cumulative stress, allegedly suffered
through the day of the employee's termination. The court, annulling an
award of workers' compensation benefits, stated in dictum:
Had the record demonstrated that the injury was caused by termina-
tion, it is clear the [employee's] injury would not be compensable, be-
cause it would not be work-related within the meaning of Labor Code
§ 3600, which requires that an injury arise out of employment, occur
in the course of employment, and be proximately caused by the em-
ployment rather than termination of employment. [The employer] cor-
rectly asserts that a termination for economic reasons--or for any
other reason-does not invoke workers' compensation liability; of
course, if the termination is wrongful, the employee is entitled to pur-
sue other legal remedies.14°
Larson makes a similar point in his treatise on workers' compensa-
tion: "The controlling fact in establishing exclusiveness is the relation-
ship of the parties at the time of occurrence of the injury. Their
relationship at other times, such as the time of the employer's miscon-
135. Id. at 903, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (quoting Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545,
551-52, 413 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1980)).
136. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 905, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (1983); see supra note 113 and accom-
panying text.
137. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 151, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987); Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 842, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 447, 452 (1978).
138. Howland, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 905-06, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
139. 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643 (2d Dist. 1983).
140. Id. at 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (emphasis in original).
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duct or the time of bringing the suit, is immaterial."' 141
Larson's view emphasizing the timing of the injury was adopted in
Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. 142 While Spratley is not a termi-
nation case, it is significant because the court looked to the timing of the
injury rather than of the misconduct in determining whether the exclu-
sivity doctrine applied. 143 Spratley was severely injured during a robbery
at work.144 She conceded that workers' compensation was the exclusive
remedy for her physical injury, 145 but she brought a civil suit for emo-
tional distress damages resulting from the employer's fraudulent induce-
ment of her acceptance of employment. 146 Spratley claimed that the
employer failed to follow through on his pre-employment promises that
the workplace would be safe. 147
The court held that, because Spratley's injuries were suffered during
her employment, her fraudulent inducement claim satisfied the condi-
tions of compensability and was thus barred by the exclusivity doc-
trine. 148 The fact that her employer's alleged misconduct-his false
promises-occurred before the employment relationship began was irrel-
evant according to the court. 149
This section has briefly reviewed the significant tort cases of the
1970s and 1980s that have defined the relationship between the workers'
compensation system and tort causes of action. Whereas Renteria and its
progeny asked whether the asserted injury was essentially physical or
nonphysical, Cole and Hart changed the focus to whether the employer's
actions were a normal part of the employment relationship. Other cases,
such as Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Spratley, have looked more to the rela-
tionship between the employee and employer at the time of the injury.
IV. Recent Cases Dealing with the Conflict Between Workers'
Compensation Exclusivity and Wrongful Termination
Tort Damages
In 1987, four California cases finally addressed the conflict between
the exclusivity doctrine and wrongful termination causes of action. Shoe-
maker v. Myers1 50 was the first of these cases, followed by Ortiz v. Bank
141. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 15, § 65.13, at 12-13 (May 7, 1987).
142. 188 Cal. App. 3d 1408, 234 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1987).
143. Id at 1412, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
144. Id. at 1410, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
145. Id. at 1412, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
146. Id. at 1410-11, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
147. Id. at 1412, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
148. Id., 234 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
149. Id at 1416-17, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
150. 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686 (3d Dist. 1987), rev. granted, 43 Cal.3d 833,
740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Aug. 26, 1987).
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of America National Trust and Savings, 151 Green v. City of Oceanside, '52
and Valenzuela v. State of California. 153 While two of these cases, Shoe-
maker and Green, appear to put the Third and Fourth Districts in con-
flict, section V explains why this is not true.
A. Shoemaker v. Myers
In Shoemaker v. Myers, ' 5 4 Shoemaker alleged that he was assigned
to investigate claims concerning health care center violations and related
misfeasance within his own department. He submitted a report that sub-
stantiated the claims, but was advised by department officials to cease his
investigation. When he objected to their obstruction of the investigation,
he was chastised by his supervisor. 155 Months later, he was mistakenly
identified as the person responsible for harassing a psychiatrist's patients.
Nevertheless, management ordered him to be interrogated three times.
When Shoemaker invoked his statutory right of representation under the
Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, management fired
him for insubordination.15 6
Shoemaker's first amended, verified complaint set forth causes of ac-
tion for "tortious wrongful termination, wrongful termination in viola-
tion of former Government Code section 19683, wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, . . . [and] intentional infliction of emotional
distress .... ,157 Shoemaker alleged that his employer's wrongful and
malicious acts caused severe emotional and physical injuries that would
result in permanent disability.
The trial court sustained the employer's demurrer with leave to
amend, indicating that the various causes of action for wrongful termina-
tion and for intentional infliction of emotional distress were all barred by
the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation, because physical
151. 824 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1987).
152. 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470 (4th Dist. 1987), rev. denied (Oct. 29, 1987).
153. 194 Cal. App. 3d 916, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45 (4th Dist. 1987).
154. 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 791, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (1987), rev. granted, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404 (Aug. 26, 1987).
155. Id. at 791, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
156. Id. at 791-92, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
157. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 792, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689. The court stated in part:
Section 19683 was a "whistleblower" statute prohibiting the use of official authority
by any state officer or employee or any person whatsoever to discourage, restrain,
interfere with, coerce or discriminate against any other state officer or employee who
in good faith reports violations of any state or federal law on the job or directly
related thereto. Any person guilty of such wrongful conduct could be liable to the
offended party in an action for civil damages.
Id. at 797, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 692 (footnote omitted). Former Government Code section 19683
was replaced by Government Code section 10548. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 797 n.4,
237 Cal. Rptr. at 692 n.4; see 1986 Cal. Stat., ch. 353, §§ 4-5.
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disability is compensable. 158  Although Shoemaker subsequently
amended his complaint and deleted the physical injury references, the
trial court found that he failed adequately to explain the deletions and
reiterated its earlier decision, as though the physical injury references
were still part of the complaint.1 59
The Third District Court of Appeal, adopting the Renteria ap-
proach to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims,1 60 deter-
mined that Shoemaker's physical injuries were more than mere
makeweight and held that exclusivity barred the causes of action for
wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 161
The court also rejected Shoemaker's contention that his employer's in-
tentional misconduct should exempt these causes of action from the ex-
clusivity bar. Extending Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 162 the
court stated that "[d]isciplinary hearings and actions, such as termina-
tion, are an inherent part of the employment setting and thus a normal
risk of employment."1 63
Lastly, the court rejected Shoemaker's argument that since his claim
was based on a "whistleblower" statute' 64 that allowed a civil action for
damages, his claim should not be barred by the exclusive remedy provi-
sions of workers' compensation. Shoemaker asserted that rules of statu-
tory construction should resolve any conflict between the statutes in his
favor because the whistleblower statute was enacted more recently. The
court, however, held that the exclusivity bar of the workers' compensa-
tion statute, which is more specific as to the nature of the injury and as to
the relationship between the parties, should prevail.165
On August 26, 1987, the California Supreme Court granted Shoe-
maker's petition for review.' 66
B. Ortiz v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Less than two months after Shoemaker, in Ortiz v. Bank of America
158. Id. at 792, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
159. Id. at 792-93, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
160. See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
161. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 793-95, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689-91.
162. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
163. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
164. See supra note 157 regarding the "whistleblower" statute, former Government Code
section 19683.
165. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 796-98, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93. But cf Jones v.
Los Angeles Community College Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 794, 807-09, 244 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41-45
(injuries sustained as a result of racial discrimination, which is proscribed by a civil rights
statute, constitute a harm separate from a disabling physical injury covered by workers' com-
pensation; therefore, the workers' compensation exclusive remedy statutes will not bar a tort
claim of statutory racial discrimination, because the statutes cover separate wrongs).
166. Shoemaker v. Myers, 43 Cal.3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987).
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National Trust and Savings, 167 the Ninth Circuit, applying California
law, addressed the conflict between wrongful termination and workers'
compensation. Ortiz was terminated following eighteen years of employ-
ment. 168 She filed workers' compensation claims for psychic injuries that
produced a continuing disability. Ortiz' subsequent compromise and re-
lease of her workers' compensation claim indicated that her psychic inju-
ries had arisen out of her employment. 169 She agreed to release the bank
from all claims or causes of action regarding or resulting from her inju-
ries, but also filed a state civil action for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and discrimination. The bank
then removed the case to federal court. 170
In special verdicts the jury found that the workers' compensation
release did not bar her claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The jury also found that the bank had breached the cove-
nant, and it awarded Ortiz damages for lost wages, pension benefits, and
other fringe benefits. The jury, however, found that she was not entitled
to damages for emotional distress. 17 1
In upholding the jury award to Ortiz for her employer's breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court explained
that a workers' compensation settlement does not eliminate the injured
worker's right to pursue a civil action for the invasion of other interests,
absent a specific provision in the release to that effect. The court stated
that California's "primary rights doctrine"'172 requires analysis of the dif-
ferent rights involved:
[T]he right protected by the [Workers' Compensation Act] is the right
not to be physically or emotionally injured on the job, while the right
protected by the covenant of good faith is the right not to be unfairly
deprived of the benefits of employment. The harm Ortiz suffered was
the loss of employment and the damages she received were for loss of
income and fringe benefits. The WCA covers the injuries and risks of
employment, not injuries flowing from unemployment. 173
The court also pointed out that the rationale behind the emotional dis-
tress cases was inapplicable because Ortiz did not sue for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. "Rather she prevailed on a claim of breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, i.e., a claim that the [em-
ployer] unfairly and in bad faith deprived her of her right to receive the
167. 824 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1987).
168. Id. at 694.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Under California's "primary rights doctrine," the invasion of one primary right gives
rise to a single cause of action. There is only one cause of action for one personal injury that is
incurred by reason of one wrongful act. See, e.g., Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795,
543 P.2d 593, 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225, 226 (1975).
173. Ortiz, 824 F.2d at 695-696.
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benefits of employment." 174
C. Green v. City of Oceanside
Two weeks after Ortiz, the California Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal175 upheld a jury award of damages for emotional distress suffered as
a result of wrongful termination. Green sued for wrongful termination
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 176 He was
notified of his termination by mail while on medical leave to obtain psy-
chological counseling, a need the court presumed was caused by unfair
chastisement at work.177
The court rejected the employer's contention that an award of dam-
ages for emotional distress should be barred by the exclusivity provisions
because Green's employer failed to raise exclusivity as an affirmative de-
fense. 178 Previously, the employer had asserted only that damages
caused by wrongful termination could not overlap those damages to
which Green was entitled under workers' compensation. Consequently,
the trial court instructed the jury that it could not award damages for
stress Green suffered prior to his termination. 79 In upholding the jury
award for Green's post-termination emotional distress damages, the ap-
pellate court indicated that a wrongful termination rarely would result in
a compensable injury under workers' compensation:
We question whether the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of a
wrongful termination may properly be termed an "injury" for the pur-
poses of section 3600. The Supreme Court appears to be comfortable
with a rule stating that a civil suit will be barred by the exclusive rem-
edy doctrine only if "the essence of the wrong is personal physical in-
jury or death . . . ." [Even if the damages are termed an injury],
however, the reasoning of Renteria v. County of Orange and its prog-
eny would strongly suggest that a cause of action for wrongful termi-
nation is not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions because it
rarely if ever would result in an employment "disability," a necessary
predicate for workers' compensation.' 80
D. Valenzuela v. State of California
Less than one month after Green, the Fourth District decided
174. Id.
175. Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1987), rev.
denied (Oct. 29, 1987).
176. Id. at 216, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
177. Id at 218, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
178. Id at 223, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
179. Id. at 223 n.2, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 475 n.2.
180. Id at 223-24, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Cole v.
Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308,
315 (1987)).
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Valenzuela v. State of California. I'l Valenzuela alleged that he was
"forced" to take a disability retirement after enduring a campaign of har-
assment by his supervisor. He claimed that he suffered physical and
emotional injuries and work disability as a result of the harassment; that
he was agitated and depressed; that he could not work or sleep; and that
he suffered from palpitations, weight loss, headaches, and earaches.18 2
The Valenzuela court did not address whether the exclusivity provi-
sions applied to Valenzuela's cause of action for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing because Valenzuela had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies. The court, however, affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of Valenzuela's cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, holding that workers' compensation was
Valenzuela's exclusive remedy because his injuries were compensable.18 3
Apparently his injuries were deemed compensable because he was suffi-
ciently disabled to take a disability retirement.
V. Critical Analysis of Recent Cases Dealing with the Conflict
Between Workers' Compensation Exclusivity and
Wrongful Termination Tort Damages
The four cases discussed in the preceding section illustrate differing
approaches to the exclusivity issue. This section sets forth a critical anal-
ysis of each of these cases.
A. Shoemaker v. Myers
The opinion in Shoemaker v. Myers' 84 is seriously flawed in several
respects. The court (1) failed to examine separately the "essence of the
action" and conditions of compensability as to each cause of action, (2)
failed to distinguish between normal and wrongful termination when the
employer's intentional misconduct has a questionable relationship to the
employment, and (3) erred when it perceived a conflict between the
"whistleblower" statute and workers' compensation exclusivity statutes.
As a result, Shoemaker is an excellent illustration of the logical traps
awaiting the unwary court in the confrontation between wrongful termi-
nation and workers' compensation.
(1) Essence of the Action
First, the court-without explanation-applied the physical versus
emotional harm analysis used in the intentional infliction of emotional
181. 194 Cal. App. 3d 916, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1987).
182. Id. at 922-24, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
183. Id. at 919-24, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 47-50.
184. 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1987), rev. granted, 43 Cal.3d 833, 740
P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Aug. 26, 1987).
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distress cases 185 both to the various wrongful termination causes of ac-
tion and to Shoemaker's cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 186 Determining whether a physical injury allegation is
more than a mere makeweight may be critical in assessing whether work-
ers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Prior to Shoemaker, how-
ever, there was no case law that applied this factor to a wrongful termina-
tion cause of action.
The Shoemaker court's problematic analysis may be traced to sev-
eral errors. First, it neglected to examine whether the essence of any of
the wrongful termination causes of action involved a compensable injury
under workers' compensation. Severe emotional distress is the essential
damage element of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Determin-
ing whether the physical injury is more than mere makeweight is a key to
the "essence" of that action because it directly answers the question
whether a compensable injury under workers' compensation is involved.
In contrast, the main harm of wrongful termination is deprivation of the
benefits of employment, 8 7 and emotional distress damages typically are
secondary to or derivative from that harm.188 Deprivation of the benefits
of employment is not the basis of an "injury" within the purview of the
Workers' Compensation Act;1 89 therefore, it is not compensable. Thus,
if the "essence of the action" is wrongful deprivation of employment, the
action should not be barred by the exclusivity doctrine even if there is
some incidental physical injury or other resulting disability related to
emotional distress.190
Arguably, an employee could use the tort of "wrongful termination"
to shield against exclusivity. For example, an employee might be rein-
stated with back pay shortly after his wrongful termination (and thus not
substantially deprived of his right to the benefits of the employment), and
185. See supra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 793-95, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689-91.
187. Cf Ortiz v. Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust and Say., 834 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir.
1987)(right protected by covenant of good faith is right not to be unfairly deprived of the
benefits of employment).
188. See, eg., Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 216, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470,
476 (1987), rev. denied (Oct. 29, 1987)(affirming emotional distress damages that followed
termination).
189. Cf Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286, 289 (1983)
(slander and resulting damage not within purview of workers' compensation law); see also
Ortiz v. Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust and Say., 824 F.2d 692, 695-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (right pro-
tected by covenant of good faith is right not to be unfairly deprived of benefits of employment,
while right protected by workers' compensation is right not to be physically or emotionally
injured on the job). In addition, where the cause of action is for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, courts should also take into account the additional underlying harm
resulting from infringement of the right to be free from the particular public policy violation.
190. 2A A. LARsoN, supra note 15, § 68.34(a), at 13-110 to -111 (1987).
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his post-termination, compensable, emotional-physical injuries might be
extremely disabling. Then, the essence of the action might truly be his
physical injury or disability, and not the deprivation of employment.
Shoemaker was reinstated several months after being terminated.191
He claimed that he would probably have some unstated, residual perma-
nent disability, despite amelioration of his total disability as of his rein-
statement date.1 92 Aside from the court's general indication that
Shoemaker alleged that his health was harmed as a result of the unlawful
termination,1 9 3 there were no facts to suggest that his emotional distress
or disability was caused by the wrongful termination rather than by the
employer's pretermination misconduct. Thus, the opinion neglects to es-
tablish, as it should, that his termination-caused harm was either com-
pensable or rising to a level sufficient to recharacterize the "essence of the
action" as a physical injury or disability (rather than a deprivation of
employment).
Perhaps because the Shoemaker court failed to distinguish the
wrongful termination causes of action from intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, it also failed to contrast the timing of wrongful termina-
tion injury as opposed to that of an intentional infliction of emotional
distress injury. For an injury to be compensable under workers' compen-
sation, it must arise out of, occuir in the course of, and be proximately
caused by the employment.1 94 While the employer's misconduct in
wrongfully terminatirig -an employee typically does arise out of and occur
in the course of the employment, the "deprivation of employment" dam-
ages (for example, wage loss and post-termination emotional distress)
arise out of, occur in the course of, and are proximately caused by the
unemployment that follows. 195
Additionally, workers' compensation law distinguishes between
"separate" 1 9 6 and "cumulative" injuries.19 7 By analogy, Shoemaker's
wrongful termination was a separate post-termination "injury," not com-
pensable under the workers' compensation statutes, and requiring a sepa-
rate accounting of damages. It was distinct from, albeit related to, his
pretermination, compensable injuries. Thus, even if pretermination dis-
tress existed as a result of the employer's campaign of harassment, aggra-
vation of that distress by wrongful termination should have been
separately assessed as a byproduct of the "separate" injury of wrongful
191. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 792, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
192. Id. at 795, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
193. Id.
194. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West Supp. 1988).
195. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 75, 192
Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1983).
196. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.2 (West Supp. 1988).
197. Id. § 3208.1.
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termination-an injury that is not within the purview of workers' com-
pensation law.
(2) Normal Risks of Employment
After disposing of exclusivity and compensability, the Shoemaker
court held that termination is a "normal risk" of employment, so that
there is no implied or statutory exception to exclusivity, as there might
have been if the termination were intentional misconduct only questiona-
bly related to the employment. 198 There are two flaws in this logic.
First, it is highly doubtful that wrongful termination is a "normal
risk" of employment. A termination for good cause or because of a good
faith mistaken belief that good cause exists would be a normal risk of
employment. In contrast, a discharge that is either a violation of public
policy or a bad faith attempt to deprive the employee of his right to the
benefits of the employment agreement is not a normal risk of employ-
ment. The Shoemaker court failed to distinguish between the normal
risk of legitimate termination and the abnormal risk of wrongful
termination.
Second, by again failing to analyze separately the causes of action
for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the court ignored the fact that the main harm in a wrongful termination
cause of action-deprivation of employment-is noncompensable under
workers' compensation. 199 Instead, the Shoemaker court treated Shoe-
maker's termination merely as the intentional misconduct element of his
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding
Shoemaker's "injury" to be compensable under that legal theory, the
court erroneously required that the employer's misconduct have a "ques-
tionable relationship" to the employment before it would allow an ex-
emption from exclusivity. 20°
The court should have applied the Renteria principle that an action
at law should not be barred where there has been intentional misconduct
causing a noncompensable harm.201 The Renteria court reasoned that it
would be unfair to apply Labor Code section 4553, which permits a fifty
percent surcharge to deter serious and willful misconduct by the em-
ployer, to situations where it will only produce "50 percent of
198. Shoemaker v. Myers, 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 795-96, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686, 691-92
(1987), rev. granted, 43 Cal.3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Aug. 26, 1987).
199. Georgia-Pacific, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
200. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 795-96, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
201. Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840-41, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451-
52 (1978); cf Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp., 43 Cal. 3d 552, 559, 737 P.2d 771, 776, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 572-73 (1987) (exclusivity barred survivors' action, even though workers' compen-
sation was completely offset by retirement system benefits, because some remedy was provided
for employer misconduct).
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nothing. '20 2
(3) Statutory Construction
Finally, the Shoemaker court applied the rule of statutory construc-
tion that a narrower, more specific statute takes precedence over a
broader, more general statute.20 3 The main flaw in the court's reasoning
is its initial assumption that Government Code section 19683, the
"whistleblower" statute underlying each of Shoemaker's wrongful termi-
nation causes of action, was in conflict with the workers' compensation
statute. In reality, the "whistleblower" statute and the workers' compen-
sation statutes do not conflict. The type of harm sought to be redressed
by the whistleblower statute is not the type of injury contemplated by the
workers' compensation law. The essence of an action based on the
whistleblower statute is not physical injury or disability, but rather it is
the right to be free of retaliation for "blowing the whistle" on unlawful
acts. 20 4 The comparative specificity of the whistleblower and workers'
compensation statutes-used as the deciding factor by the court-is irrel-
evant because the statutes address two essentially different rights.
B. Green v. City of Oceanside
Superficially, the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in
Green v. City of Oceanside20 5 appears to conflict with the Third District's
decision in Shoemaker. In contrast to Shoemaker, Green held that the
workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions did not bar the em-
ployee's wrongful termination cause of action.20 6  It must be
remembered, however, that Green's employer failed to raise exclusivity
as an affirmative defense,20 7 whereas in Shoemaker the employer's de-
murrer was sustained because of the exclusivity bar.20 8 Also, Green did
not allege any physical injury or disability associated with his termina-
tion-caused emotional distress. 20 9 Shoemaker, however, did allege physi-
cal injury and disability, at least part of which may have been construed
to be termination-caused. 2 10 Thus, the procedural posture and facts of
each case may well explain the differing results. The potential for con-
flict and for confusion, however, does not end here.
202. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
203. Id. at 796-98, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.
204. See supra note 157.
205. 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1987), rev. denied, (Oct. 29, 1987).
206. Id. at 216, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
207. Id. at 224-25, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
208. Shoemaker v. Myers, 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 793, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689 (3d Dist.
1987), rev. granted, 43 Cal.3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Aug. 26, 1987).
209. Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 218, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470, 471-72
(1987), rev. denied, (Oct. 29, 1987).
210. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 795, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
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In Green, the court questioned "whether the damages suffered by a
plaintiff as a result of a wrongful termination may properly be termed an
'injury' for the purposes of § 3600."211 Since section 3600 of the Labor
Code sets forth the conditions of compensability,2 12 one might construe
the Green- court to question whether wrongful termination damages
could arise out of, occur in the course of, or be proximately caused by the
employment. If Green's "question" regarding wrongful termination
damages was intended to be answered in the negative-suggesting that
wrongful termination damages are noncompensable under workers' com-
pensation-then the court would be in conflict with the Shoemaker court,
which argued that terminations are "an inherent part of the employment
setting. '213 The Green court not only left its own question unanswered,
but it went on to say "that a cause of action for wrongful termination
[would] not [be] barred by the exclusive remedy provisions because it
rarely if ever would result in an employment 'disability', a necessary predi-
cate for workers' compensation. 214 The logic of Green would fail if its
question of wrongful termination damages were intended to be answered
unequivocally in the negative. In this dictum, the court implicitly seems
to be leaving open the possibility-albeit "rarely if ever"-that wrongful
termination damages might be an "injury" and might satisfy the condi-
tions of compensability where the wrongful termination results in an em-
ployment disability. While this logic is not altogether satisfactory, this
dictum may be a further indication that there is no true conflict between
the Third and Fourth Districts, since the Shoemaker court may have
construed the employee's disability to have been at least in part the result
of the wrongful termination.
The Green court erred, however, if it meant that an employment
disability resulting from a wrongful termination can bring the wrongful
termination cause of action within the scope of the exclusivity doctrine.
As discussed earlier, a disability resulting from a wrongful termination
arises out of, occurs in the course of, and is proximately caused by unem-
ployment, rather than by employment.215
C. Ortiz v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings
In Ortiz v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings,2 16 the only
relevant issue before the Ninth Circuit was the employer's contention
that the exclusivity doctrine should apply to overturn a jury award of
damages for lost wages, pension and fringe benefits for a wrongful termi-
211. Green, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
212. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West Supp. 1988).
213. Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 795, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
214. Green, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 224, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (emphasis added).
215. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 75, 192
Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1983).
216. 824 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1987).
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nation breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court
upheld the jury award, correctly pointing out that the wrongful depriva-
tion of the benefits of employment is not within the purview of workers'
compensation and that such a deprivation flows from unemployment, not
employment. 21 7 Ortiz did not cross-appeal the jury's denial of emotional
distress damages, apparently because she had executed a workers' com-
pensation settlement and release for disabling "psychic injuries" arising
from her employment. 218 Thus, unlike the court in Shoemaker, the Ortiz
court did not preclude an action at law for wrongful termination, despite
the fact that there was arguably a related, compensable emotional dis-
tress injury. It is unclear from the opinion, however, whether Ortiz had
alleged emotional distress damages resulting from the wrongful termina-
tion that were distinct from the psychic injuries covered by the workers'
compensation settlement and release. 219 Theoretically the jury's denial
of such damages would have been erroneous. Jury instructions providing
that such damages would be precluded because of the settlement and
release would also have been erroneous. The court commented, however,
that the jury award was appropriate both because the employee did not
assert a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
because the jury did not award her any damages for emotional injuries
resulting from her treatment by the employer.220 These comments are
potentially misleading because the court places undue importance on the
name of the tort rather than on the essence of the action.
D. Valenzuela v. State of California
In Valenzuela v. State of California,221 causes of action both for
wrongful termination breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing and for intentional infliction of emotional distress were before the
Fourth District Court of Appeal. The wrongful termination action was
dismissed, however, because the employee failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies.22 2
One might speculate about the significance of the court's total si-
lence over whether the exclusivity doctrine applied to the wrongful ter-
mination cause of action, especially because Valenzuela was decided by
two of the three judges who had handed down the Green opinion less
than one month earlier.223 Green alluded to the possible bar of exclusiv-
217. Id. at 696 (citing Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 905, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286,
289 (1983)).
218. Id. at 694.
219. Id. at 695.
220. Id.
221. 194 Cal. App. 3d 916, 919, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45, 46-47 (1987).
222. Id. at 919-22, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 47-49.
223. Id. at 918, 924, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 46, 50; Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal. App. 3d
212, 216, 230, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470, 471, 480 (1987), rev. denied (Oct. 29, 1987).
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ity for claims of employment disability resulting from the wrongful termi-
nation. 224 In Valenzuela, the employee allegedly suffered an employment
disability prior to his termination, as a result of the employer's mistreat-
ment.225 The court's silence about the applicability of the exclusivity bar
to the wrongful termination action may, thus, reflect the court's view
that exclusivity was inapplicable, since the employment disability did not
result from the wrongful termination. 226
The court did hold, however, that workers' compensation was the
employee's exclusive remedy for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress cause of action.227 The Valenzuela court's treatment of the two
causes of action separately is also relevant, especially in contrast to Shoe-
maker's analytical treatment of them as indistinguishable.
VI. Proposed Four-Step Analytical Approach
The preceding review demonstrates that there is substantial confu-
sion among California courts in their approaches to the exclusivity issue.
For example, the Shoemaker Court failed to distinguish between the vari-
ous causes of action; and the Green court wrongly implied that wrongful
termination damages could consitute an "injury" for workers' compensa-
tion purposes. These decisions, along with Ortiz and Valenzuela, also
appear to lack a logical framework for analyzing exclusivity issues, espe-
cially as they relate to wrongful termination claims. This section sug-
gests such a framework.
Absent a consistent approach to predict whether exclusivity will ap-
ply to a wrongful termination cause of action, plaintiffs may be reluctant
to plead either their temporarily or partially disabling emotional distress
injuries and distress-related "physical" injuries that were caused by the
termination, or their related causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Plaintiffs may fear that any such allegations will bar
their wrongful termination actions at law.228 If tort damages are sup-
posed to make the plaintiff "whole, '229 the necessity for such a pleading
strategy is clearly unfair to the plaintiff. A consistent approach to evalu-
ating whether exclusivity applies to the facts of a wrongful termination
case would facilitate more accurate pleading of the plaintiff's true dam-
ages. In rare cases, it could even steer the plaintiff into the workers'
compensation forum first.
224. Green, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 223-24, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
225. Valenzuela, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 918-919, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
226. It can be surmised that Valenzuela's employer did not assert exclusivity as a defense
to the good faith and fair dealing cause of action.
227. Valenzuela, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 922, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
228. See, eg., Schwartz, Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District: Does the Workers'
Compensation Exclusive Remedy Bar Damages for Emotional Distress in Wrongful Termina-
tion Cases?, 9 CEB CIv. LITIGATION RPTR. 132 (1987).
229. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984).
Employers would also benefit from a consistent approach to this is-
sue. Ideally, providing employers with a clearer understanding of what
types of intentional misconduct may expose them to tort liability will
deter that misconduct. Finally, a generally accepted, step-by-step analyt-
ical scheme will promote judicial efficiency and uniformity of law.
Most of the current confusion for parties attempting to decide which
causes of action are appropriate-and legally acceptable--can be re-
solved by adoption of a four-part analysis. In its skeletal form, this four-
step approach asks the following questions, in sequence:
1. Was there an "injury" within the purview of workers' compen-
sation law?
2. Did the conditions of compensability concur as to that injury?
3. Does the cause of action fall within the scope of the exclusive
remedy provision?
a. Is the nature of the tort within the scope contemplated by
the workers' compensation statutes?
b. Is the essence of the cause of action an injury under work-
ers' compensation law?
4. Is it clear that none of the statutory or "implied" exceptions to
exclusivity apply?
If the answer to all questions is "yes," then workers' compensation
is the exclusive remedy. If the answer to any of the four main questions
is "no," then the exclusive remedy provision does not apply, and the
employee can pursue an action at law.
A. Step One: Was There an "Injury" Within the Purview of Workers'
Compensation Law?
The starting point for any potential workers' compensation claim
must be a determination whether there was an "injury. '230 The Labor
Code provides that an injury must cause a mental or physical work disa-
bility or a need for medical treatment. 231 For example, a wrongfully ter-
minated employee who needs psychiatric treatment to deal with his loss
of self-esteem has suffered an "injury" for which he needs medical treat-
ment. An employee who cannot work a full day on a new job because of
continuing problems with depression has suffered an "injury"-a partial,
mental work disability. An employee who is unable to work at all for a
period of three months because of a heart attack has suffered an "in-
jury"-a total, perhaps temporary, physical work disability.
This first step does not distinguish between physical and mental in-
juries. Such a distinction is not inherent in the Labor Code provisions
230. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 23, § 11.01(1), at 11-3.
231. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1 (West Supp. 1988).
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and may be merely an idiosyncrasy of decisional law with regard to the
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Step Two: Did the Conditions of Compensability Concur as to that
Injury?
If an "injury" exists, the more difficult question is whether all of the
conditions of compensability concurred at the time of the employee's in-
jury.232 The Labor Code requires that the injury arise from and in the
course of employment, and that it be proximately caused by the employ-
ment. 233 For example, if a wrongfully terminated employee's need for
psychiatric treatment develops after he is no longer employed by the de-
fendant-employer, the conditions of compensability would not concur as
to that injury. Similarly, if an employee's partially disabling depression
develops while the employee is sitting at home without a job or while
being turned down by new employers, the conditions of compensability
would not concur. Likewise, if the employee suffers a heart attack fol-
lowing his termination, the conditions of compensability would not con-
cur. In each case, the injury does not arise in the course of employment.
Less clear is whether the conditions of compensability concur where
the employee needs psychiatric treatment while being harassed on the
job, but does not actually seek treatment until after his loss of self-esteem
is worsened by the wrongful termination. Analytically, there are two
separate injuries. First, there is the emotional distress caused by on-the-
job harassment. That injury might satisfy the conditions of compen-
sability since it arose from, in the course of, and was proximately caused
by the employment. In that case, the employee's exclusive remedy would
be workers' compensation. Second, there is emotional distress arising out
of, in the course of, and proximately caused by the unemployment. 234
That injury most likely would not satisfy the conditions of compen-
sability since it occurred after the employment was terminated.
In an even more difficult fact pattern, suppose the employee suffers
angina pains caused by the stress of being subjected to harassment at
work and is consequently only able to work part-time. Then, as a result
of a wrongful termination, his heart condition is aggravated, and he has a
totally disabling heart attack two weeks after his discharge. Again, there
are two injuries. The angina pains and partial disability arose out of, in
the course of, and were proximately caused by the employment; they sat-
isfy the conditions of compensability. In contrast, the disabling heart
attack at least arguably arose out of, in the course of, and was proxi-
232. See id § 3600(a).
233. Id.; see supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
234. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 75,
192 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1983).
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mately caused by the unemployment and would not satisfy the conditions
of compensability.
In analyzing these fact patterns the focus should always be on the
timing of the injury, 235 not on the timing of the employer's misconduct
(e.g., the wrongful termination). Additionally, if an earlier, compensable
injury caused by the employment is later aggravated by the wrongful ter-
mination-caused unemployment, the employee should be able to recover
tort damages for that portion of the injury caused by the
unemployment. 236
C. Step Three: Does the Cause of Action Fall Within the Scope of the
Exclusive Remedy Provision?
If there is a compensable injury, the trier of fact should next deter-
mine whether the particular cause of action falls within the scope of the
exclusive remedy provision. This third step addresses two questions.
First, is the nature of the technical tort within the scope contemplated by
the workers' compensation statutes? Second, is the essence of the cause
of action an injury under workers' compensation law?
(1) Is the Nature of the Tort Within the Scope Contemplated by the Workers'
Compensation Statutes?
The workers' compensation statutes are intended to provide benefits
for injuries caused by employment itself.237 Wrongful termination causes
of action, therefore, are beyond the scope contemplated by the workers'
compensation statutes because these actions are intended to recover dam-
ages resulting from the deprivation of employment. 238 Although a
wrongful termination may additionally result in a derivative injury such
as mental or physical disability, the basis for a cause of action for depri-
vation of employment does not disappear.239 On the other hand, the
mere pleading of wrongful termination should not automatically shield
the employee from the exclusivity bar.24° An additional inquiry must be
235. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 15, § 65.13, at 12-13 (May 7, 1987); cf Spratley v.
Winchell Donut House, Inc., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1408, 1411-12, 234 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122-23
(1987) (when an employee suffers emotional injury during employment, the employees' emo-
tional distress claim satisfies the conditions of compensability and is thus barred by the exclu-
sivity doctrine).
236. Cf CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.2 (West 1971) (where there are multiple injuries, ques-
tions of fact and law, including apportionment between injuries, will be separately determined
for each injury).
237. Id.
238. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav., 824 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1987).
239. Cf. Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286, 288 (1983)
(slander and resulting damage not within the purview of workers' compensation law).
240. See Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W.L. REV. 1,
11-13 (1975).
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made.
(2) Is the Essence of the Cause of Action an Injury Under Workers'
Compensation Law?
The evaluator must also determine whether the essence of the
wrongful termination cause of action is the deprivation of employment
or, alternatively, an injury under workers' compensation law. For exam-
ple, if causation of a temporarily but totally disabling heart attack is un-
clear and the employee is subsequently reinstated with back pay, the
essence of the wrongful termination may truly be a compensable "injury"
rather than the deprivation of employment. In this case, the employee
should be barred from an action at law to recover damages for disabling
emotional distress, disabling physical injuries, the need for medical treat-
ment, or punitive damages.
The analysis of the essence of the action, however, should not stop
there. If the basis of the cause of action is a violation of public policy, the
egregiousness of the underlying violation should be weighed against the
severity of the injury. The weighing should consider whether statutes
explicitly permit a civil action where there has been such a violation.
Similarly, if the cause of action is based on the breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, the egregiousness of the employer's bad faith
should be weighed against the severity of the injury. Thus, this balancing
approach should be done on a case by case basis, with the outcome heav-
ily dependent on such factors as the severity of the injury, the duration of
the unemployment period following the termination, and the egregious-
ness of the public policy violation or breach.
Even if the significance of the injury is determined to outweigh these
other factors, and even if the essence of the wrongful termination action
is held to be injury under workers' compensation law-rather than the
deprivation of employment-the employee should not be barred from a
civil action to recover damages for wage loss, pension, and other fringe
benefits. The employee should be barred only from recovering damages
for disabling physical injuries, and for medical treatment.
D. Step Four: Is it Clear that None of the Statutory or Implied Exceptions
to Exclusivity Apply?
There are several statutory exceptions to the exclusivity bar that the
evaluator should consider. 24' If, for example, the employer does not
carry workers' compensation insurance, the employee can pursue an ac-
tion at law,242 even where the "extraordinary facts" result in a "yes"
answer to each of the first three steps. In most instances, however, the
241. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3602, 3706, and 4558 (West Supp. 1988); see supra notes 44-50.
242. Id § 3706 (West Supp. 1988).
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statutory exceptions will not apply, in which case it must be determined
if any implied exceptions apply.
Currently, courts appear to recognize an "implied exception" to ex-
clusivity in certain instances of an employer's intentional misconduct.
Thus, where "employers step out of their roles as such and commit acts
which do not fall within the reasonably anticipated conditions of work,
they may not then hide behind the shield of workers' compensation. '243
An employer's intentional misconduct, either terminating an employee,
in violation of public policy, or as a bad faith breach of the implied-in-
law covenant, surely exemplifies an employer's stepping out of its proper
role. Therefore, an employer that commits such an act should not be
able to hide behind the shield of workers' compensation.
Conclusion
The limited liability umbrella of the workers' compensation exclu-
sivity doctrine is an attractive shelter for employers, given the recent del-
uge of wrongful termination tort claims. The same players (employers
and employees) and the same types of injuries (for example, emotional
disability) may be involved in both a workers' compensation claim and a
wrongful termination action at law. Occasionally, this fact has led courts
to apply the exclusivity doctrine erroneously to bar wrongful termination
suits.
The confrontation between workers' compensation exclusivity and
wrongful termination causes of action first appeared in the appellate
courts in 1987. Unfortunately, case law in this area is both limited in
scope and analytically confusing. Thus, courts, attorneys, employers,
and wrongfully terminated employees need a comprehensive and consis-
tent framework to be able to determine if the exclusive remedy provision
applies in a given case.
This Note proposes the following four-step analysis to determine
whether exclusivity applies to a particular cause of action: (1) Was there
an "injury" within the purview of workers' compensation law? (2) Did
the conditions of compensability concur as to that injury? (3) Does the
cause of action fall within the scope of the exclusive remedy provision?
(4) Is it clear that none of the statutory or "implied" exceptions to exclu-
sivity apply?
A careful, step-by-step application of this analysis to a wide spec-
trum of fact patterns demonstrates that, except in extraordinary cases,
the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation simply do not
apply to the wrongful termination causes of action for violation of public
policy or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
243. Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1431, 235 Cal. Rptr.
68, 75 (1987), rev. denied (June 17, 1987).
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the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation simply do not
apply to the wrongful termination causes of action for violation of public
policy or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

